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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4615
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4869
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9986
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2858
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002004

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS WRANGLE FOR CONTROL OF
PEACE PROCESS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1984

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 1994

[1](#)C. KATHMANDU 1865

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

PLOTTING DIRECTION FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

[1](#)1. (C) On July 25, Suresh Chalise, Prime Minister GP Koirala's foreign relations adviser, told DCM that the Government of Nepal (GON) was uncertain as to what the Maoists wanted out of the peace process. He accused Maoist Chairman Prachanda of objecting to the spirit of the June 16 eight-point agreement and the best interests of the country in his July 24 letter to the UN (ref A). Chalise stated that the GON planned to prepare a calendar for the peace process after the visit of the UN assessment team, which arrives on July 26. He reported that the GON had already started to work on the calendar, which would set the date of the constituent assembly elections and all milestones until then, including a bilateral cease-fire agreement and interim constitution.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING FOR MAOIST DISARMAMENT

[1](#)2. (C) DCM observed that the political parties agreed that Maoists must disarm before joining an interim government. Chalise replied that the GON, encouraged by this consensus, was working on confidence-building measures to convince the Maoists to disarm. He claimed that the GON was ready to do whatever possible to build confidence with the Maoists. The PM's adviser promised that the GON would provide personal security to Maoists once they disarmed. (Note: Deputy PM Amik Sherchan in a separate meeting had mentioned that Maoist concern for their own safety was a roadblock (ref B). End Note.) Chalise told DCM that he would tell us about additional confidence-building measures at a later date.

MAOISTS WANT CARTER CENTER PARTICIPATION

[1](#)3. (C) Chalise enigmatically noted that there had been "no confusion" regarding the visit of a Carter Center delegation in mid-July. (Note: On July 14, a Nepali weekly reported

that the Carter Center met with Maoist leaders, and concluded erroneously that this was a reversal of U.S. policy barring USG meetings with Maoists. The Carter Center reportedly offered to monitor constituent assembly elections (ref C). End Note.) The PM's adviser showed DCM a copy of a letter that Prachanda had sent to the Carter Center after the delegation's visit, requesting former President Carter's assistance as a peace process facilitator. Chalise said the letter was "off the record" but did not offer additional perspective.

COMMENT

14. (C) Chalise, like other interlocutors, showed little concern about Prachanda's July 24 letter to the UN. The PM's adviser expressed confidence that the GON could overcome Maoist obstacles. Prachanda's invitation to the Carter Center is further evidence of the Maoists' tactical skill, and the value of additional external mediators in Prachanda's view. We can expect the Maoists to continue to exploit similar opportunities to shape the peace process.

MORIARTY